1. What's at stake Geach (1962:39,154) suggests that nouns carry, as part of their meaning, criteria of identity: 1 (1) Heraclitus bathed in some river yesterday, and bathed in the same river today.
(2) Heraclitus bathed in some water yesterday, and bathed in the same water today.
Geach notes that (1) can very well be true (he washed in the same river) at the same time that (2) can be false (he washed in different water). Apparently, whether the fluid Heraclitus washed in on the two days counts as the same or not depends on whether we conceive of that fluid either as a river, or as water. (Geach explicitly assumes that whatever is a river is water. ) Geach concludes that nouns, in addition to having criteria of applicationroughly, the properties in virtue of which an object counts as a river-they also have criteria of identity: criteria that determine whether the river Heraclitus bathed in yesterday is the same river as the one he bathed in today. If so, then two distinct quantities of matter can count as the same river without counting as the same water.
Geach's arguments in favor of recognizing criteria of identity have been strengthened by Gupta (1980) and Carlson (1982) . As a result, a number of linguists (including myself in earlier work, Barker 1998 Barker , 1999 have endorsed criteria of identity as an essential part of nominal meaning. Indeed, Baker (2003:95) proposes criteria of identity as the essential difference between nouns and verbs cross linguistically. The stakes could hardly be any higher!
Nominalizations play an important role in this discussion for two reasons. First, we shall see that the most compelling examples that support postulating criteria of identity for nouns happen to be deverbal nominalizations. This is particularly interesting given that verbs are generally assumed to not have any special criteria of identity. If verbs don't have such criteria, but (some) productive deverbal nominals do, how do the nominalizations come by their criteria? The hope, then, would be that nominalizations can potentially provide a window into both the semantics of derivational morphology, and into the nature of criteria of identity.
Somewhat reluctantly (given my previous commitments), I will argue here that nouns do not in fact have criteria of identity, at least not as any idiosyncratic part of their meaning. The mistaken impression that they do comes from the fact that some nominals, including certain productive nominalizations, have meanings that promote a certain kind of pragmatic shift in meaning, a shift similar in some ways to metonymy. However, nothing special need be said about criteria of identity in the lexical meaning of nominals, including nominalizations.
Arguments for nominal criteria of identity
Geach offers two operational tests for reasoning about identity: counting, and sameness. As Geach (1962:39) puts it, we ...cannot count As unless we know whether the A we are now counting is the same A as we counted before.
Geach's claim is that two objects will be distinct relative to a nominal concept N only if we count them as two Ns. Conversely, if we can refer to one of them as the same N as the other, they must be identical (relative to the choice of a noun N).
Geach is adapting Frege's (1884, §62) claims relating specifically to the concept of number:
If we are to use the sign a to signify an object, we must have a criterion for deciding in all cases whether b is the same as a... In doing this, we shall be giving a general criterion for the identity of numbers (ein allgemeines Kennzeichen für die Gleichheit von Zahlen). This translation (by J.L. Austin) appears to be the origin of the expression 'criteria of identity'.
Though Geach is undoubtedly right that counting and sameness are intimately related, as linguistic tests they must be used with caution, since, as we shall see in section 4, they sometimes give divergent results.
The counting test: passenger versus people
Beginning with the counting test, Gupta strengthens Geach's case in favor of postulating criteria of identity. There is a non-essential weakness in Geach's motivating examples, since he confounds criteria of identity with the difference between mass and count. For instance, in (1), river is a count noun, and in (2), water is a mass noun. The same confound is present in other examples of Geach's (the statue versus the stuff the statue is made of, etc.). Ever since Link (1983) , it is common to provide a systematic mapping (more specifically, a homomorphism preserving joins) from the set of individuals into the quantities of matter that make them up, e.g.:
Here '⊕' is the join operation in the domain of count individuals, '+' is the join operation in the domain of mass quantities, and µ maps individuals to the quantity of matter that make them up. Then this equation expresses the thought that the stuff that makes up the sum of the earrings is the same as the sum of the stuff that makes up each individual earring. Since the earrings (earring 1 ⊕ earring 2 ) denote a distinct entity from the stuff that makes them up (µ(earring 1 ⊕ earring 2 )), it is easy to understand how we can count two earrings without counting two 'golds'. Using Link's proposal, the river/water puzzle can be resolved by allowing the homomorphism µ to change over time, so that the two distinct quantities of water can easily be part of the matter making up the same river.
Along similar lines, we can explain Frege's (1884, §22) observation that if we confront a person with a pile of playing cards and ask him to count them, he cannot oblige unless we provide a noun such as card or deck, since there may be 52 cards but only one deck. This fact falls out from the assumption defended in Barker (1992) and Schwarzschild (1992 Schwarzschild ( , 1996 that group nouns such as deck denote atomic objects that are independent of (though related to) the individuals (the cards) that serve as members of the group.
The card/deck example establishes that the counting of objects must be relative to a specific noun (deck versus card). But given a linguistic ontology on which decks are distinct objects from collections of cards, this behavior is entirely explained by the criteria of application for these nouns, and there is no need for postulating differences in criteria of identity.
Fortunately for advocates of criteria of identity, Gupta (1980) provides a different class of examples that contrast a count noun with a count noun:
(3) Easyjet served 10 million passengers last year. (4) Easyjet served 10 million people last year.
The intuition is supposed to be that (3) can be true at the same time that (4) is false. The idea is that there are as many passengers as their are trips, so that if a person flies on Easyjet twice, that one person counts as two passengers. (I will challenge aspects of these judgments below.)
This contrast is a paradigm use of the counting test: since passengers certainly are people, one way to understand how it could be that the number of passengers is different than the number of people is by postulating the noun passenger has more stringent criteria of identity: the same person on two different trips counts as two distinct passengers. As Gupta (p. 23) puts it, "the principle of identity for passenger is clearly non-trivial." 2.2. The sameness test: passenger versus different passenger Geach suggests that two nouns have the same criteria of identity only if the expression the same N can be predicated of the same class of objects for both nouns. For instance, in (1), the same river is truly predicated of what Heraclitus bathed in, but the same water is not.
As mentioned above, the contrast between river and water follows from ordinary theories of plurals. In order for the sameness test to come into its own, we need to apply it to examples that contrast pairs of count nouns: This contrast is a variation on an observation in Barker (1998) . Assuming that (5) can be true at the same time that (6) is false, we have evidence that the number of passengers can differ depending on how strict we make our criteria of identity. From the point of view of an advocate of criteria of identity, we can suppose that the lexical criteria of identity for passenger counts the same person on two different flights as distinct, but composition with different results in a complex nominal whose criteria of identity are more coarse-grained, with only one passenger per person. On the face of it, then, (5) and (6) constitute a minimal pair in which the criteria of application remains constant and only the criteria of identity change.
Productive nominalizations
The noun passenger is a borrowing from French, and is not the result of any productive derivational process of English. Carlson (1982) suggests that we also need non-trivial criteria of identity for productive nominalizations.
(7) Clements struck out 15 batters in a row in the game last night.
This sentence is supposed to be capable of being true despite the fact that baseball teams consist of only nine players, as long as these nine players continued to go to bat over the course of 5 innings until Clements has achieved his 15 strike-outs. Barker (1998 Barker ( , 1999 claims that the only productive nominalizations in English that can have non-trivial criteria of identity are agentive -er nominals and -ee nominals.
Let us take these data a face value for now and imagine what they tell us about the meaning of the nouns involved. Carlson (1982) suggests that some nouns, such as batter, have stages in their extension, where a stage is a temporal slice of an individual. In the same way that a neck is a part of a person that is limited in its spatial extent (say, the part that extends from the head to the shoulders), a stage is a part of an individual that is limited instead in its temporal extent: the portion of the individual that extends from one moment of time until some other later moment of time. Thus caterpillar, boy, and teenager all arguably have stages of individuals in their extension.
But caterpillar, boy, and teenager do not lead us to suspect that some nouns have non-trivial criteria of identity, since they all involve stages that occur once per lifetime. In order to give rise to a counting discrepancy, it is necessary for a noun to describe stages that an individual can go through more than once. That is why it is important for present purposes that a single person can be a passenger again and again, and a single baseball player can be a batter more than once in a single game.
It appears, then, that the most persuasive examples of nouns with nontrivial criteria of identity are nouns that have in their extension objects that are systematically linked with events. That is, a batter is a person who participates in a certain role in a batting event; a passenger is a person who participates in a certain way in a travelling event; and so on.
Sameness versus identity
From Geach onward, discussions of criteria of identity have been intertwined with discussions of sameness. For Geach (1962:152) , the semantic behavior of the schema the same N constituted at least an operational test, and perhaps even a definition for criteria of identity: "[T]he same A and the same B will give criteria of identity iff A and B are substantival terms [i.e., common nouns]." Gupta (1980: 2) refines Geach's test:
But, as Geach noted, common nouns, unlike predicates, also supply a principle of identity. A common noun, such as 'river', provides a rule that determines when an object at a time (and a world) is the same river as an object at another time (and a world)...
Gupta is careful to distinguish the test from the rule: "...the principle of identity for river is the rule IN VIRTUE OF WHICH an object at a time (and a world) is the same river as an object at another time (and a world)." Baker (2003:105) goes further, building the concept of sameness into the meaning of the noun at the most fundamental level:
• Semantic version: nouns and only nouns have criteria of identity, whereby they can serve as standards of sameness.
• Syntactic version: X is a noun if and only if X is a lexical category and X bears a referential index, expressed as an ordered pair of integers.
• For any noun X, the syntactic representation X {j,k} corresponds semantically to the interpretation 'j is the same X as k', or in symbolic terms same(X)(j, k).
For instance, we have (p. 105):
(14) a. I bought a pot i and a basket k . The pot i is heavy. b. I bought a pot i and a basket k . The pot n is heavy. n = i c. I bought a pot {i,k} and a basket {l,m} . The pot {n,i} is heavy.
Here, (14a) is the traditional Principles and Parameters style representation, in which the fact that the two occurrences of the pot have the same subscript indicates that they refer to the same object. In (14b), we have a Discourse Representation Theory style presentation. Each occurrence introduces a new index, but when we decide that the two occurrences of the pot refer to the same object, we equate their indicies (e.g., "n = i"). In (14c), we have Baker's proposal, on which each nominal introduces two indicies. Since we have that i is the same pot as k, and that n is the same pot as i, we recognize that i, k, and n are all the same pot.
We shall see that the counting test and the same/different test can come apart in a way that calls into question whether criteria of identity are part of lexical meaning.
But first we must briefly discuss the meaning of same. (15) a. The porcupine and the hedgehog are the same animal.
b. I drive a Ford Falcon, and Enzo drives the same car. c. I read the same newspaper yesterday.
In (15a), it is natural kinds that are equated; in (15b), it is a type of car, not a specific car; and in (15c), it is a newspaper brand, not a specific edition. None of these interpretations are suitable for testing for identity in the sense needed here.
The problem is that although same requires a high degree of similarity, and although same is compatible with identity, it does not guarantee identity. The following examples due to Schwager (2007) are based on Partee's well known temperature puzzle: (18) The temperature if my fridge is the same temperature as the temperature in your fridge.
The temperature in my fridge is rising. The temperature in your fridge is not rising.
Since it would be paradoxical to predicate two contradictory properties of a single object, we must conclude that the temperatures of our fridges count as the same, yet are not identical. In fact, not even the very (same) N guarantees object identity:
• It just so happened that First Lady Laura Bush was wearing the very same dress too. The approximation of identity is even stronger without the word same, as in he was the very man we had met the night before. Yet even with this construction, identity is not guaranteed:
• I noticed her new purse-the very purse I had nearly purchased for myself at WalMart a couple days earlier..."I am getting that purse. We'll be purse twins!" • Or, once having arrived at a black-tie gala, come face-to-face with someone wearing the very dress you have on? • He was the very man to inspire a young enthusiast like me with awe and delight.
• A number of those who were hard pushed would seek to borrow...
Here I am again. The very man they stand in need of...
If someone is the very man you are looking for, that means that they have all of the properties of the man you are seeking, but in general there is no guarantee that your desires are specific enough to pick out a unique individual. There may be expression types that do guarantee or at least strongly promote true identity. There is a fairly obscure word in some varieties of English that seems to guarantee some kind of identity, namely, selfsame:
• Two things are the selfsame thing if changing one of them changes the other in the same way. [Hayes 1998 ] It is allowed, however, that two performances of a song can still be the selfsame song, as in these lines from a poem by Thomas Hardy:
• A BIRD sings the selfsame song...-But it's not the selfsame bird.-In German there is at least a prescriptive rule that distinguishes dasselbe 'self-same' from gleich 'same'. As Frege (1884, §76) puts it, "dasselbe may indeed be thought to refer to complete agreement in all respects, gleich only to agreement in this respect or that." As the joke goes, if I say to a waiter Ich hätte gern dasselbe wie der Herr dort drüben 'I'd like to have the same thing as that man over there', using dasselbe rather than gleiche, I am supposedly asking him to bring me the very self-same plate the other diner is eating from.
My native speaker consultants tell me that although overt contrasts between gleich and dasselbe certainly go in the predicted direction, dasselbe can be nevertheless be used for similar but non-identical objects. It is certainly possible that some language somewhere contains a predicate that rigidly guarantees perfect identity. At this point, however, a certain degree of scepticism is called for.
If criteria of identity really were such a fundamental aspect of nominal meaning, as suggested by Baker, it would be somewhat surprising that there aren't more expressions that provide reliable access to those conditions. On the other hand, if predicates like same take as their content more elusive, nonlinguistic notions of similarity, as I will suggest below, this behavior makes complete sense.
Differentness
Of course it is logically possible that althought same is treacherous, different is perfectly reliable. Not so.
In most circumstances, as we have seen, different forces a per-individual reading. There is a strong intuition that a claim about 10M different passengers has to be a claim about distinct people. If a nouns like ship are ambiguous between an per-individual versus a per-event denotation, then we can speculate that different converts a set of stages into a set of individuals (see Barker (1998) for a more detailed explanation of how this might work technically).
Unfortunately for advocates of criteria of identity, it turns out that nominals of the form different N can probably receive a per-event interpretation. If we can construct a situation in which we are in danger of confusing stages, it may be possible for different to do some useful work without forcing an individuallevel interpretation.
Imagine therefore that you work for Easyjet, and you are faced with a stack of receipts for drinks that have been bought on two recent Easyjet flights. Your job is to calculate the average amount spent on alcohol per passenger. Then your boss might ask you How many different passengers do these receipts correspond to?. There is no need to figure out which passengers correspond to the same individual across the two flights; rather, it is only necessary to figure out which receipts correspond to a single passenger stage. If so, then different is not guaranteeing true identity, but only stage identity.
Furthermore, different participates in the same slippery type/token equivocations as same. Here is a naturally-occurring example:
Q. How many different business cards do you need? A. Quite simply, you need different business cards for each 'type' of client that could want your product or service. If different guaranteed distinct individual cards, the only answer would be several hundred. But here it means something more like How many different kinds of business cards do you need?.
I conclude that using expressions such as same, different, and their ilk as an operational test for identity must be done with far more caution than at least the linguistics literature has so far exhibited.
Having made this stern declaration, I will immediately admit that many of the paraphrases given throughout this paper using same and different will be perniciously imprecise. Nevertheless, I trust that in most places my meaning is clear enough, and that devising some clumsy but more precise way of talking would be too tedious to be worthwhile.
Arguments against nominal criteria of identity
The arguments I will advance below will bring pressure to bear on the claim that nominals have criteria of identity distinct from criteria of application.
If criteria of identity do exist, they're not (exclusively) lexical
Krifka (1992) discusses a phenomenon that bears a striking similarity to the Geach/Gupta facts: (8) 4000 ships passed through the lock (last year). [Krifka 1992] (9) 4000 different ships passed through the lock. [Barker 1998 ] Krifka judges that (8) is ambiguous: it either has a per-ship reading, which guarantees that there are at least 4000 distinct ships that passed through the locks; or else it has a per-event reading, on which there may be fewer than 4000 distinct ships, as long as the total number of lock traversals is at least 4000. In contrast, (9) seems to only have the per-ship reading.
On Krifka's analysis, (8) contains an ambiguous silent determiner. One version of the determiner gives the usual per-individual reading, and the other gives the per-event reading. As pointed out in Barker (1998) , the fact that (9) does not have a per-event reading is surprising on such an analysis: if it is the determiner that introduces the ambiguity, we should expect that ships and different ships both denote a set of distinct ship individuals, incorrectly predicting that (9) should have all of the interpretions available to (8). The alternative, of course, is that any ambiguity must be associated with the nominal, which comports well with the examples introduced above in section 2.
If the variability in construal of (8) is indeed part of the same phenomenon as the passenger/people opposition (as I believe it is), it has an important consequence: it shows that criteria of identity are not exclusively part of lexical meaning, but depend also on compositional or pragmatic variability. The reason it shows this is that, as Krifka points out, it is implausible that the noun ship is ambiguous between an individual-level denotation and a stagelevel denotation. Unlike, e.g., passenger, objects in the extension of ship do not have any systematic association with any specific event. Therefore the per-event reading is contributed by some semantic or pragmatic factor independent of the noun itself.
If per-event readings are available for nouns such as ship, the simplest analysis is that whatever mechanism provides the per-event interpretation for ship also provides the per-event interpretation for nouns like passenger and batter. If so, two predictions follow. The first is that even the most implacably individual-level noun should be capable of a stage-level use. This seems to be the case. For instance, consider person. Certainly when person is explicitly contrasted with passenger, as in Gupta's original examples, given above in (3) and (4), we will be more likely to associate a perindividual interpretation with person and a per-event interpretation with passenger.
But in other contexts, a per-event interpretation of people does arise. The careful arithmetic in the following excerpt from the web page of the Baton Rouge United Way guarantees that the first occurrence of people must receive a per-event interpretation: The answer-writer clearly intended for the word people to answer a question about passengers. The numbers make it highly likely that people is used here with a per-event interpretation, counting each deplaning passenger as a distinct person.
A similar point is made by this example:
Newton has a new, state-of-the-art, award-winning Library which served 602,951 people in 1993.
This sentence appeared on a real estate profile which reports that the population of Newton as 84,603. Given that public libraries typically require proof of local residence, it is highly unlikely that the author of this sentence assumed that the library served more than half a million different people. In other words, this appears to be a per-event interpretation of people. I claim, then, that person can be used with per-event criteria of identity. This is certainly not because person can have as part of its criteria of application anything like charity-recipient or library-patron. Thus even if some nouns arguably have non-trivial criteria of identity, it is certainly possible for non-trivial criteria of identity to be supplied by semantic context or perhaps by the pragmatics.
The second main prediction that follows from assuming that per-event interpretations are never lexical is that even those nouns like passenger or batter that are highly compatible with a per-event interpretation should be capable of capable of a per-individual use. The question, then, is whether Easyjet served exactly 1 million passengers can be true if Easyjet served 1 million different people, each of whom flew on Easyjet twice (for a total number of trips of 2 million). I suspect that the sentence does have such an interpretation, but it is difficult to be sure. We can, however, get indirect support for this claim based on examples such as (10).
(10) Half of the passengers were women.
If passenger only had a per-event interpretation, we would expect this sentence to be able to be true if 5 million tickets were purchased by 1 million women, even if the other 5 million tickets were purchased by 5 million different men. I suspect that this sentence could be used in such a situation. However, my native speaker informants agree that it also has a reading on which it is true if each woman passenger flies only once but each male passenger flies five times, as long as the number of women is at least as large as the number of men. The only way the sentence could be true in such a situation is if passenger received a per-individual interpretation.
In sum, under the right pragmatic circumstances, all nouns seem capable of a per-event interpretation, and conversely: even those nouns most heavily biased in favor of a per-event interpretation can be interpreted with perindividual criteria of identity.
Availability of per-event interpretations is pragmatically restricted
If per-event readings did arise from lexical meaning, they should be available no matter what the pragmatic context. Yet per-event readings are difficult if not impossible in contexts in which it is implausible that the discourse participants could loose track of the identity of the individuals involved.
It is no accident that Gupta's key example involves millions of passengers, and that Kifka's key example involves thousands of lock traversals. The principle I am suggesting is that an interpretation will fail to recognize two objects as the same individual in roughly the same circumstances in which a human would. It is no accident that the best examples of this phenomenon concern situations in which there are too many individuals to easily keep track of; in which the individuals involved are so similar that they are difficult to distinguish; or in which events are typically widely separated in time from each other or from the utterance time. Carlson's example (batter) is an interesting case, since a batting sequence of nine players is just long enough to be difficult to hold in one's mind at once. In contrast, it is not possible to say that McGwire hit home runs off three pitchers in a row unless there are three different pitchers involved: spectators are expected to keep careful track of when pitchers are replaced.
Similarly, it would be odd for me to report that I drove five of Easyjet's passengers to the airport if all five of them were my husband. Yet if the same person on different trips really did count as a different passenger, that it what we would expect. In the same situation, it would be even more difficult to respond to the question How many of Easyjet's passengers live in your house? with the answer "5".
Criteria of identity are suspiciously limited in variation
If nouns were able to lexically specify criteria of identity, we would expect to see a wide variety of non-trivial criteria of identity. However, as near as I can tell, criteria of identity come in exactly two flavors: the normal, default perindividual criteria (the usual interpretation of person), and per-event criteria (passenger).
In the case of nominalizations such as traveller or batter, the putative criteria of identity are closely related to a prominent component of the criteria of application. A person is a traveller by virtue of participating in a travelling event, and a person is a batter by virtue of participating in a batting event.
In general, we can say that a nominalization is EPISODICALLY LINKED to its stem verb just in case an object satisfies the predicate only if it participates in the type of event corresponding to the stem verb. Similarly, we can say that passenger is EPISODIC, since a person counts as a passenger only by virtue of participating in a (nonfree) traveling event. Whether episodically linked or merely episodic, these nouns apply to an object only if the object participates in a characteristic QUALIFYING EVENT.
The reason episodic nominals are such good candidates for hyperindividuation is that their criteria of application make a certain class of eventsthe relevant qualifying events-highly salient. When such a noun appears in a sentence in which the main predicate describes their qualifying event, a hyperindividuation reading becomes prominent: when Easyjet serves 10M passengers, each serving event is coextensive with the travelling event that qualifies the person in question as a passenger; when Clements strikes out 15 batters, each striking-out event is simultaneous with the batting event that qualifies the person as a batter, and so on.
In order to see how limited criteria of identity are, it will help to imagine what a class of nouns with an idiosyncratic set of identity criteria might look like. Therefore consider the brother relation: a person x counts as a brother just in case x is male and x participates in a sibling relation with some other person y. If being a sibling were a qualifying eventuality, and if nouns could have arbitrary lexical criteria of identity, we might expect the number of brothers could exceed the number of people. That is, if John, Bill, and Tom all have the same parents, and if brother had per-eventuality criteria of identity the way passenger is supposed to, then John, Bill, and Tom will count as three people but six brothers (one for each being-the-sibling-of eventuality that qualifies the person as a brother). But this is absolutely not possible in English, nor, I strongly suspect, in any other language.
Well, perhaps non-trivial criteria of identity require participation in a verbal event, rather than a stative eventuality such as being a sibling. Imagine, then, a room containing Paul Erdos and two other mathematicians. Erdos is collaborating with each of the other mathematicians, so Erdos is involved in exactly two separate projects. (The two non-Erdos mathematicians are not collaborating with each other.) How many collaborative teams are there in the room? The answer is clear and robust: two teams, with Erdos as a member of both. How many collaborators are there in the room? The answer "four" is completely impossible. Erdos cannot count as two distinct collaborators, despite the fact that he is involved in two distinct collaborations.
On the other hand, now imagine that each collaboration resulted in a single paper. How many authors put their names on the papers? Here, four is a possible answer ("Erdos" put his name on both papers). Yet still, how many published authors are in the room? Still only three. Similarly, if Erdos is simultaneously playing two games of chess, one with each of his collaborators, there are still only three chess players in the room, not four; and if Erdos wins both games, there is only one winner, not two.
Thus on any given occasion, the number of individuals counted for the nominals collaborators, authors, winners, and players cannot exceed the number of individuals.
As near as I can tell, it is never possible to have more stages than there are individuals at any given moment of time.
Spatio/temporal exclusion principle: if two objects are distinct with respect to a nominal predicate N (distinct according to either the counting test or the sameness test), then the objects either occupy different places or different times.
The ring and the gold the ring is made of can be distinct objects occupying the same place at the same time because we individuate them with respect to different nominal predicates (say, ring versus gold). But for a given fixed choice of noun, say passenger, a single person at some particular moment of time cannot count as more than one. The number of passengers in a room at a particular moment of time can never exceed the number of people. This is surprising if nouns really did have non-trivial criteria of application. If nominals had the lexical power to distinguish more individuals than there are objects in view, why shouldn't the number of collaborators in a room be able to exceed the number of people?
Conclusions
Nominals provide only criteria of application. There are no lexical criteria of identity, either for nominals or for verbs. The impression that some nominals have non-trivial criteria of identity is due to the fact that in certain limited pragmatic situations, nominals can shift their meaning from a set of individuals (people) to a set of stages (passengers). Because some nominals are episodically linked to a set of events (passenger, batter), they are especially likely to undergo this meaning shift, but under the right circumstances, other nominals can shift (ship). Circumstances that promote per-event shifts include situations in which tracking individuals becomes difficult: large numbers of individuals, long periods of time between observations, or salience of a nominal's qualifying events. Under no circumstances, however, can two distinct stages occupy the same place and the same time.
Unfortunately, a detailed formal analysis of this meaning shift is beyond the scope of this paper, though see von Heusinger and Brandtner's detailed discussion of predicate transfer in this volume for detailed and insightful consideration of a variety of approaches to similar sorts of meaning shift.
Ultimately, then, identity depends on spatial, temporal, and causal contiguity, and not on lexical nominal meaning.
